UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-14-2015

State v. Easterday Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
41831

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Easterday Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41831" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5287.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5287

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
ASHLI MARIE EASTERDAY,

Defendant-Appellant.
________

)
)

NO. 41831

)

TWIN FALLS CO. NO. CR 2013-7372

)
)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLERANDYJ.STOKER
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

JAN 1 4 2015
Supreme ourt__ url of App0ais_

Entered oo ATS by _ _

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

PAGE
OF AUTHORITI

.................................................................................. ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. 1
Nature of

Case .................................................................................. 1

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................4
Because Deputy Gorrell lmpermissibly Expanded
Court Erred
Car To A Search Of Ms. Easterday's Person, The
When It Denied Ms. Easterday's Motion To Suppress ................................... .4
A. Introduction ..............................................................................................4
B. The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Relies On
Precedent That Does Not Concern Purses, Misstates The
Facts Of One Case, And Ignores The Fact That The
District Court Actually Relied On One Of The Cases
The State Calls Inapplicable To This Case ................................................ .4
1. Purses And Wallets Are Different Than Other Containers
Because They Are Often Considered Part Of The Person
And Therefore Not Subject To Search Under The
Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement.. ......................... .4
2. Idaho's Precedent Regarding Purses That Were Searched
Under The Search Incident To Arrest Doctrine Is Not
Inapplicable, And Its Precedent Regarding A Wallet
That Was Searched Under the Automobile Exception
Is Directly On Point ............................................................................... 7
C. The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Fails To Grasp
How And Why Purses Are Used, As Well As The Inherent
Discrimination and Unworkable Aspects In The District
Court's Ruling ............................................................................................. 9
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................... 8
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (2000) ................................................................. 6
State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698 (1998) ............................................................... 7
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2004) ....................................................... .4
State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................................................4
State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115 (Ct. App. 2011 ) ...................................................... 5
United States v. Ross, 56 U.S. 798 (1982) ........................................................... 5
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963) ......................... 11
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) ......................................................... 5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ashli Marie Easterday appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to
suppress evidence found in a search of her purse. In the district court, she asserted
that, following a traffic stop and a canine alert on her vehicle, the officer illegally
searched her purse.

The district court denied the motion because it found that

Ms. Easterday's purse was not on her person at the time probable cause to search the
car was established, and therefore, the purse was subject to search under the
automobile exception.

Subsequently, Ms. Easterday entered a conditional plea of

guilty, preserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easterday argued that the search of her purse was a
search of her person, which is not allowed under the automobile exception.

She

asserted that the search of the purse was a search of her person because her purse
was in normal use when she was stopped by the officer; it was right next to her on the
car seat. And, when she was told to leave the car after the canine alert, she brought it
with her. She also argued that the district court's ruling would create an unworkable
and discriminatory standard because it would require that, in order to be considered a
part of her person, a woman's purse must be in her lap when driving, and for the
duration of a traffic stop.
The State argues that the search of Ms. Easterday's purse should be viewed like
the search of any other container. In other words, the fact that this search concerned a
purse should be of no consequence in the analysis. Indeed, the State likens her purse
to a backpack in the back seat of a car. It also argues that some of the precedent on

1

which Ms. Easterday relies in her Appellant's Brief is inapplicable to this case because it
is based on the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement instead of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Finally, the State asserts that

there is no inherent discrimination in treating men's wallets differently than women's
purses.
The State's arguments fail. First, the Idaho Court of Appeals has acknowledged
that purses and wallets are unique and often considered part of the person and
therefore not subject to search like other containers in a car. And, while the State's
second argument neatly summarizes the difference between the automobile exception
and the incident to arrest exception, the State provides no reason as to why this
difference is relevant to an analysis of the circumstances under which a purse is
considered part of the person.

It also ignores the fact that the district court, in its

memorandum opinion, specifically relied on some of the precedent the State calls
"inapplicable" to this case. More importantly, it misstates the facts of the only case that
it admits is applicable to this situation.

Finally, the State's argument regarding

discrimination misses the point as to why women need to carry purses in the first place.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Easterday's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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Because Deputy Gorrell impermissibly expanded the search of the car to a search of
Ms. Easterday's person, did the district court err when it denied Ms. Easterday's motion
to suppress?
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Because Deputy Gorrell lmpermissibly Expanded The Search Of The Car To A Search
Of Ms. Easterday's Person, The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's
Motion To Suppress
Introduction
motion

The district court should have granted Ms.

suppress

because law enforcement illegally searched her purse, which should have been
considered part of her person when she exited the car with it. Therefore, the purse was
not subject to search without a warrant.

The State's arguments to the contrary fail

because the State does not acknowledge that purses are considered part of the person
when in normal use, and thus, they are not like

containers.

Further, the State

misunderstands Ms. Easterday's arguments in regards to the discrimination inherent in
treating purses differently than wallets,

B.

the problems with the district court's ruling.

The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Relies On Precedent That Does
Not Concern Purses, Misstates The Facts Of One Case, And Ignores The Fact
That The District Court Actually Relied On One Of The Cases The State Calls
Inapplicable To This Case
1.

Purses And Wallets Are Different Than Other Containers Because They
Are Often Considered Part Of The Person And Therefore Not Subject To
Search Under The Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement

The Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "We agree that a purse and perhaps a billfold
are items that can be considered part of the person, much like the clothing a person is
wearing." State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 183 (Ct. App. 2004). Similarly, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Breyer, of the United States Supreme Court wrote:
Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal
items that people generally like to keep with them at all times. So I am
tempted to say that a search of a purse involves an intrusion so similar to
a search of one's person that the same rule should govern both. However,
4

given this Court's prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the
container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the
Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction. But I can
say that it would matter if a woman's purse, like a man's billfold, were
attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of "outer clothing,"
which under the Court's cases would properly receive increased protection
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted).
The warning Justice Breyer was referring to is the language from United States v.
Ross, 56 U.S. 798 (1982).

There, the Court said that "[t]he scope of a warrantless

search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which the
contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places
in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id. at 824. However,
as the Idaho Court of Appeals, and obviously Justice Breyer, have recognized, this
standard does not always apply to purses and wallets because they are often
considered part of the person because of the way they are used and the highly personal
nature of their contents.
The State's analysis in this case ignores the unique nature of purses. In
particular, it does not acknowledge how they are used by female drivers. Therefore, it
relies on precedent that is not relevant to an analysis of a purse search and is easily
distinguishable. Indeed, the State asserts that this case is similar to State v. Smith, 152
Idaho 115 (Ct. App. 2011).

(Resp. Br., pp.6-8, 10-11.)

In Smith, the defendant

originally left his car and walked over to speak with an officer. Id. at 117. When the two
men returned to the car so that Mr. Smith could show the officer his identification, the
officer saw a marijuana pipe on the front seat of the car. Id. This established probable
cause to search the car, but Mr. Smith had a dog in the car that posed a threat to the
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officer. Id. at 121, 117. When the officer asked Mr. Smith to take the dog out, Mr. Smith
took his backpack from the backseat and used the straps on the backpack to restrain
the dog.

Id. at 117.

Later, the officer searched the man's backpack and found

marijuana. Id. at 118-19. The State argues that Ms. Easterday's situation is similar to
that of the driver in Smith, and, therefore, "[t]he same analysis that vvas applied to
Smith's backpack should be applied to Easterday's purse." (Resp. Br. p.8.) However,
the facts of Smith more closely resemble those of State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159
(2000), where the defendant voluntarily left her purse behind in the car and then asked
to take it later. Id. at 163. 1

Additionally, not only are the facts in Smith easily

distinguishable from this case, but the State fails to recognize that a backpack is not
regarded as a repository of personal items that can be considered part of the person. A
backpack is just a piece of luggage.
Here, Ms. Easterday never left her purse in the car; she took it with her
immediately upon being told get out of the car. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19, p.18, L.20p.19, L.1.) But more importantly, even if Mr. Smith had taken his backpack with him
when he left the car, it likely would have been subject to search because it was not a
purse or a wallet, but rather a regular piece of luggage. Therefore, it could not have
been considered part of his person.
The State's confusion stems from its focus on only one part of Ms. Easterday's
argument Br. p.5.)

that when she took her purse with her, it was not subject to search. (Resp.

While taking it with her was obviously important, it would not have been

important if she had taken a backpack with her, or, if she had originally left her purse in

1

See Appellant's Brief pp.8-9.
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the car when told to exit. But she did not do that. Here, her purse was sitting right next
to her, where a purse would ordinarily be, while she likely retrieved her identification for
the officers. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19.) And Ms. Easterday took the purse with her, as
a woman ordinarily would when leaving her car, so it was a part of her person, unlike
the backpack in Smith, which could never be considered part of Mr. Smith's clothing.

2.

Idaho's Precedent Regarding Purses That Were Searched Under The
Search Incident To Arrest Doctrine Is Not Inapplicable, And Its Precedent
Regarding A Wallet That Was Searched Under the Automobile Exception
Is Directly On Point

The State also argues that, except for one case, "[t]he cases relied on by
Easterday are distinguishable" and "inapplicable because they analyze the scope of the
search incident to arrest doctrine, and do not examine the scope of the automobile
exception." (Resp. Br., p.8.) It cites to no authority for this statement except to say that
"[t]he district court found the search incident to arrest doctrine is not applicable to this
case." (Resp. Br., p.10.) As argued in the Appellant's Brief, the district court went to
great lengths to point out that this case does not involve the search incident to arrest
exception, and stated that the Holland case was not instructive because it concerned a
search incident to arrest. (App. Br. p.12.) But the State fails to acknowledge that even
though the district court tried to make this distinction, it specifically relied on State v.
Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 700 (1998), which was also decided based on the search

incident to arrest exception. It said, "Unlike the facts in Newsom, the facts in the instant
case make clear that at no point during the deployment of the drug dog did Easterday
remove the purse from its position beside her and place it on her lap such that it
became a part of her person .... " (R. p.104.) Thus it is clear that the action that the
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purse's owner takes is the important consideration, not the exception to the warrant
requirement under which the case is analyzed. And ultimately, whether these cases are
inapplicable is not the critical issue, because there is a case that was decided under the
automobile exception that should have controlled this situation. That case was State v.
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005).

While the State admits that Gibson is applicable, it misstates the facts of that
case.

It states that "Gibson's wallet was in his jacket at the time the drug dog

established probable cause to search. In contrast, Easterday's purse was not on her
person at the time probable cause to search was established .... " (Resp. Br., p.8.)
But the Gibson Court never made the finding that Mr. Gibson's wallet was in his jacket
at the time probable cause was established.

In fact, there was no finding that

Mr. Gibson even had his jacket on when the dog alerted on the vehicle. 2

This

misstatement is the reason why the State ignores the argument made in the Appellant's
Brief that states "[t]here is no meaningful difference between the facts in Gibson and the
facts in this case other than the fact that Ms. Easterday exited her car with a purse
instead of a wallet." (App. Br. p.11.)
Additionally, the misstatement appears to be the reason why the State fails to
address the fact that the Court of Appeals did not analyze where Mr. Gibson's wallet
was when the dog alerted on his car. As argued in the Appellant's Brief, it is highly
likely that Mr. Gibson had to show his driver's license to the officers, and that his license
was in his wallet. (App. Br. p.11.) Therefore, his wallet was probably out of his jacket at
some point.

But again, the Gibson Court was not concerned with this because
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Mr. Gibson's wallet was on his person by the time he exited his car. 3 That was the
crucial fact.
Thus, because the State fails to acknowledge the unique nature of purses, it
does not comprehend the nuance involved when a "container" is a purse or a wallet.
Indeed, it says that "[u]nder the automobile exception the issue is not whether the
container was on her person when it was searched, but where the container was when
probable cause to search was established." (Resp. Br. p.5.) But with a purse or a
wallet, the analysis is not as straightforward as the State would like it to be. Indeed, if
the purse or wallet is in normal, ordinary use in the car, and the driver takes it out of the
car when exiting, it should be considered part of the person and not subject to search.

C.

The State's Arguments Fail Because The State Fails To Grasp How And Why
Purses Are Used, As Well As The Inherent Discrimination and Unworkable
Aspects In The District Court's Ruling
The State asserts that "Easterday's argument that a rule of this nature would

discriminate against women because women cannot carry their purses while they drive
and men can carry their wallets while they drive is without merit." (Resp. Br. p.11.) In
support of this contention, it says that men can also "carry satchels, briefcases, tote
bags, or other containers that contain identification or other personal items," and a
"special 'purse' exception to the automobile exception, would create an unworkable

The traffic stop was in the middle of the night in February, so he certainly would have
needed to put on his jacket when he was told to get out of the car. Id. at 286.
3 During the suppression hearing, the district court actually asked the prosecutor "How
is this case different from the Gibson case?" (Tr. 10/25/13, p.18, Ls.15-16.) The
prosecutor replied that it was different because in Gibson the officers searched
Mr. Gibson's jacket and found his wallet, so it was "very clearly a search of his person."
(Tr. 10/25/13, p.19, Ls.1-5.)
2
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dilemma for law enforcement who would have to determine if a bag, satchel, briefcase
or other container would qualify as a 'purse' and not be subject to search." (Resp.
Br. p.11.)
First of all, it is obvious that men can carry larger bags if they so choose. The
important point is that they do not have to. Women do. Not only do they need to carry
more things, but their clothing, unlike men's, often has no pockets. One could just as
easily argue that women could carry wallets, so purses should not be considered part of
the person. But again, this argument fails to acknowledge why women carry purses.
Secondly, given that law enforcement officers receive extensive training, it seems
a stretch to assume that they could not discern whether a certain bag was a purse or
not. And any confusion would not create an unworkable dilemma as the State asserts.
The only dilemma that could be created is that an officer would need to get a warrant.
This is certainly a negligible burden to ensure that women are entitled to the same
privacy as men in their personal possessions.
And the only way to guarantee this is to acknowledge that purses and wallets, as
long as they are in normal use (and not, for example, in the back seat, where the driver
could not claim any ongoing use or control of the item), do not have to be in some sort
of direct contact with the driver in order to be considered part of the person as long as
the driver leaves the car with the purse or wallet.

Because they both contain

identification, there will almost always be occasions when the wallet or purse is moved
to a slightly different location in order to access that identification, or perhaps reach into
the glove compartment to retrieve registration and insurance. Thus, requiring women to
keep purses on their laps while driving, and throughout the duration of a traffic stop, in
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order to enjoy the same privacy rights in purses that men enjoy in wallets is not only
unsafe but unrealistic.
Therefore, the search of Ms. Easterday's purse was illegal. Evidence discovered
as a result of an illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). As such, the district court erred when
it denied Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Easterday respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
order of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied her motion to
suppress.
DATED this 14 th day of January, 2015.

(
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellat~ Public Defender
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